The reports of our death have been exaggerated

Barry Rubin, writing in the Jerusalem Post, doesn't think much of the idea that American influence will no longer be a factor in world affairs:

Suddenly, there's a new fad in discussing international affairs today, and it may be summarized as the "America is dead" school. Echoing Iran, Western - including US - analysts are claiming that recent events prove the United States is a pitiful, helpless giant.

What the heck is this based on? The only two pieces of evidence seem to be the fact that the US has been unable to transform Iraq and Afghanistan into stable democracies in a brief span of time. And, one might add at the extreme limit, that it has not ended the Arab-Israeli conflict, defeated the forces of radical Islamism, or stopped Iran from developing nuclear weapons either.

This is going to be a very short-lived myth, based on an extremely near-sighted view of the international situation. Regarding Iraq, the Baker-Hamilton report - which basically proposes that America throw itself on the mercy of its worst adversaries to save itself - is already the thing that is dead. The Bush administration has already clearly rejected the report and is working on its own plan, to be issued in January.

September 11 was only a little over five years ago. Only a generation raised on television programs in which any problem in life can be solved in a half hour, with time left for commercial breaks, could complain that all the work isn't finished, the tools put away and the sawdust swept up by now.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S rhetoric has also changed quite noticeably. Instead of speaking of "victory" in Iraq, it talks of "success," which is explicitly defined as a regime in Iraq which can defend and sustain itself while being an ally in the war against terror. This is no petty verbal shift. It is a long-needed lowering of goals and expectations.

No longer will the US seek a perfect Iraq, but rather a realistic scenario of a country which can fight its own civil war. The US will help, but cannot deliver, victory in Baghdad. The style and methods used to carry on the battle will be Iraqi, not American.

This is a very good point. It was never realistic to think that an Arab/Muslim country where the primary loyalty was to sect and tribe was going to be able to be transformed into a US or UK style pluralistic democracy with stability and the rule of law.

The goal of an Iraqi government which is strong enough and stable enough to endure and (with ample US assistance) keep the lid on its own internal divisions - and resist Iranian and Syrian meddling - is very doable. And it would leave the average Iraqi far better off than he was under Saddam and far better off than the average Arab/Muslim citizen of any other nation in the Middle East (except Israel where the Arab citizens enjoy the same rights as the Jewish citizens).

In his conclusion he offers an excellent observation:

If, however, anything brings about the decline of America, it will be the kind of policies of appeasement and deliberate weakness advocated by so many of its critics and false friends.